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2001 SUPREME COURT REDUX 
By MB.nJ Stevens* 
A. TAKINGS: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. 121 S.Ct. 2448 (June 28, 2001) 
Facts: In 1959, petitioner and his fellow corporate associates purchased a waterfront parcel of 
land in Rhode Island that was primarily a salt marsh plagued by tidal flooding. Over a period of 
many years, the corporation filed several petitions seeking to develop the land with various 
government agencies and was consistently denied. In 1971, Rhode Island promulgated 
regulations designating salt marshes, such as petitioner's, as protected coastal wetlands. In 1978, 
petitioner became the corporation's sole shareholder and received title for the land. In the 
1980's, he applied to the state to fill in his marshland and was rejected based on the restrictions 
of the 1971 regulations. Petitioner then sued under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council for 
compensation of $3 .15 million, which was an appraiser's estimate of the value of a 7 4-lot 
subdivision.' 
Palazzolo argued that his payment of taxes on land that he was denied use and value of 
constituted a taking under the 5th Amendment. He argued that if Rhode Island wanted his 
property in order to preserve the marshes, than it should have condemned the acreage and paid 
him for it. Rhode Island argued that Palazzalo knew the condition of his land upon original 
purchase and later transfer of title and did not have a 5th Amendment right to compensation. 
Issue: ( 1) Whether petitioner's takings claim was ripe; (2) Whether petitioner had a right to 
challenge regulations predating 1978, the time at which he succeeded to legal ownership of the 
property; and (3) Whether petitioner's claim of being deprived of all economically beneficial use 
(needed for a Lucas argument) was contradicted by undisputed evidence that an upland parcel of 
his property was worth $200,000. 
Holding: The Court ruled 5-4: J. Kennedy wrote the op1mon of the Court in which C.J. 
Rehnquist, J. O'Connor, J. Scalia, and J. Thomas joined. J. Ginsberg, J. Souter, and J. Breyer 
dissented. J. Stevens joined the ripeness claim and dissented on (2), the notice claim. The Court 
reversed the first two claims and remanded the third for consideration under Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City. With regard to the first issue, the Court found that the claim was 
ripe. It reasoned that takings claims that challenge applications of land-use regulations are not 
ripe unless the agency charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding their application to the property at issue. In this case, the state agency made two final 
decisions rejecting petitioner's applications for development in the 1980's. On this point, J. 
Ginsberg pointed out that Palazzolo should not be allowed to engage in a "bait-and-switch ploy." 
She argued that the claim was not ripe since he never applied for permission to build the 
residential subdivision upon which his compensatory claim was based. 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, American University, Washington College of Law; Staff of INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. 
1 Lucas v. SC, 50 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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Secondly, the Court allowed "post-enactment purchasers" to challenge a regulation under the 
Takings Clause because "[t]he state may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean 
bundle." J. Kennedy stated that although a landowner's right to improve his property is subject 
to the "reasonable exercise of state authority," the Takings Clause, in some circumstances, 
"allows a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the States regulatory power is so 
unreasonable or onerous as to compel compensation." Mainly, the Court relied upon Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) in finding that Palazzolo's claim was 
not barred by the fact that the title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed 
restriction. 
J. Kennedy spent much of the decision making a "slippery-slope argument" regarding the post-
enactment transfer of title. He stated that if the plaintiff in this case is not compensated, States' 
obligations to "defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable," 
would be removed. "A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the 
Takings Clause." J. Kennedy also stated that if the plaintiff did not prevail in the case, the result 
would be a "critical alteration to the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is 
stripped of his ability to transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation." 
In her concurrence, J. O'Connor noted that when assessing a property owner's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, the state of regulatory affairs at the time the property was 
acquired, is a factor to be considered but not a dispositive one. J. Scalia, noting that he disagreed 
with J. O'Connor's analysis, explained that the existence of a restriction on property when it is 
acquired "should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so 
substantial as to constitute a taking." 
Implications: Both sides in the case claimed a victory - and some commentators have said that, 
ultimately, the decision will not significantly impact takings law. Glenn Sugamelli of the NWF 
said that the Court did not alter the manner in which it traditionally evaluates takings cases. 
Although the notice decision was cut back upon slightly, all of the same factors will continue to 
apply. It may be more expensive, he said, for state and local regulators to resist takings claims, 
but environmental protection and public health goals will still be considered in determining 
whether investment-backed expectations are reasonable. John Echeverria, of the Environmental 
Policy Project at Georgetown Univ. Law Center, commented that the Court had essentially 
reaffirmed traditional rules for resolving takings claims, but that the Court seems to be moving to 
a more fact-based analysis of particular cases, giving it more flexibility in making its decisions. 
Because of this, the outcome of a takings case becomes far more difficult to predict. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (April 24, 2001) 
Facts: Martha Sandoval, a driver's license applicant in Alabama, brought an action under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's 
official policy of administering its driver's license examination solely in English resulted in a 
discriminatory effect and was protected by Title VI. 
Issue: Whether there exists a private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations 
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
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Holding: Ruling 5-4, the Court held that a private right of action under Section 602 of Title 
VI does not exist. J. Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that although the Court often 
addressed Title VI claims, none of its prior decisions has held that a private right of action exists 
to enforce disparate impact regulations. He stated that the past rulings only established that 
private individuals can sue to enforce Section 601, which deals with intentional discrimination. 
J. Stevens, in dissent, disagreed with J. Scalia's interpretation of past cases and whether a 
private right of action was recognized by the Court. He focused on three main cases, Lau v. 
Nichols, 2 Cannon v. University ofChicago,3 and Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n of New 
York City.4 He stated that the Court made 3 distinct errors: (1) it provided a "muddled account of 
both the reasoning and breadth of our prior decisions endorsing a private right of action under 
Title VI, thereby obscuring the conflict between those opinions and today's decision"; (2) "offers 
a flawed and unconvincing analysis of the relationship between Sections 601 and 602 
ignoring more plausible and persuasive explanations detailed in our prior opinions"; (3) "badly 
misconstrues Cannon." 
Implications: 
Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
Constitutional challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment5 have not been successful for 
plaintiffs who assert environmental discrimination. Applying the highest standard of strict 
scrutiny to race-based classifications, the Supreme Court has established that a discriminatory 
purpose or intent must be proven when examining facially-neutral statutes and agency policies. 6 
Although the Court in Washington v. Davis acknowledged that disparate impact can be used as a 
factor in determining discriminatory intent, it held that a finding of disparate impact alone was 
.not sufficient to prove a violation of the equal protection clause.7 
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 8 the Court 
identified five factors which would determine whether an action was motivated by intentional 
discrimination.9 Additionally, the Court allowed the government to rebut evidence of purposeful 
discrimination by showing that "the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered."10 
2 Lauv. Nichols,414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
3 Cannon v. Univ. Chic., 441 U.S. 677 ( 1979). 
4 Guardians Assn. v Civil Serv. Comm'n of NYC, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws"). 
6 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1977) (citing Mclaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1964)). 
7 See id (holding that "absent compelling justification," a statute will not be found to be invalid if it is facially 
neutral and yet in practice "benefits or burdens one race more than another"); see also Personnel Administrator of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 272 ( 1979) (stating that if facially-neutral laws have "a disproportionate adverse 
effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional ... only ifthat impact can be traced to a discriminatory 
purpose.") 
8 429 U.S. 252 ( 1977). 
9 See id at 266-68 (including the following factors: (I) whether the effect of an action was disproportionate; (2) the 
historical background of the decision; (3) the sequence of events leading up to the decision; (4) any differences in 
standard procedure; and (5) the administrative history of the decision). 
10 See id. at 270-71 n.2. 
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Environmental Justice & Title VI 
The protections of Title VI apply to the state and local recipients of about $900 billion of 
Federal assistance, which is distributed each year by over twenty-five Federal agencies. 11 Many 
agencies, such as the EPA, have promulgated regulations that deal specifically with Title Vl. 12 
Many of these regulations only require a showing of discriminatory effect or disparate impact 
upon minority communities. 
Title VI complaints normally arise in the areas of public works and sewerage systems and 
in employment practices. 13 Because of the difficulty of showing discriminatory intent under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI was seen as a more viable alternative. Coined by 
environmental justice advocates, its use (before Sandoval) was cleverly characterized as "the 
800-pound gorilla outside the door." 14 
The implications of Sandoval are many - lawsuits based on allegations of disparate 
impact were dealt a very "severe blow" according to some commentators. Section 602 of Title 
VI was looked upon as the best statutory vehicle by which to sue for environmental inequalities 
that were the result of state permitting decisions. As noted above, like equal protection claims 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 601 requires a showing of intentional discrimination, 
which is extremely difficult. Section 602 of Title VI used to be a means by which a plaintiff 
could use statistical evidence to support claims of de facto discrimination. As an alternative to 
Title VI, commentators have suggested the use of other statutes such as Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The recent amendments to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 may be another potential vehicle. 
The first successful Title VI case, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey, 
D.N.J., No. 01-702, had its April 19, 2001 ruling invalidated by the Supreme Court decision. In 
that case, the St. Lawrence Cement Company was enjoined from operating a slag-processing 
facility because it did not consider the disparate environmental impact to the residents of 
Waterfront South, where several other large industrial facilities already operate. (The 
neighborhood is predominantly low-income African-American and Hispanic, and its residents 
suffer from disproportionately high rates of asthma and other respiratory diseases.) On May 10, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that, despite Sandoval, the plaintiffs 
in Camden, NJ could continue to assert their disparate impact claims against the New Jersey 
regulators who issued St. Lawrence's air pollution permit. The court found, as J. Stevens 
suggested in his dissent, that § 1983 would be an appropriate vehicle for private individuals to 
enforce regulations federal agencies issued to implement Title VI. 
11 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering 
Environmental Permitting Programs and Draft RevisedGuidancefor Investigating Title VI Administrative 
Complaints Challenging Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 39650, 39668, available at 2000 WL 81659. 
12 See generally 28 C.F.R. § 42. l 04 ( 1998) (Department of Justice); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5 (1997) (Department of 
Transportation); 10 C.F.R. § 4.12 (1998) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13 (1998) 
(Department of Energy); 24 C.F.R. § 1.4 ( 1998) (Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
13 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Interim Guidance 
for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits 1 (Feb. 1998), 
<http://www.es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi.html> (Visited Oct. 10, 200 I) (explaining the guidance was created to 
update EPA's "procedural and policy framework" relating to environmental permitting). 
14 See Catherine Bridge, Communities Seek 'Environmental Justice' With New Use of 1964 law, THE RECORDER, 
Nov. 24, 1999, at I. 
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